The theory of market for lemons is pretty devastating when you look at all the possible effects. Even trying to use methods that dont require central organization might not be enough to fix everything. The market could be flooded with false customers claiming a reliable seller, certification procedures not enforced by law may be willing to accept money for a certification without going through the procedure, etc. These methods may help lessen the blow, but there will likely still be many markets where the cheapest way to sell a “good product” is to lie, not to actually provide one. The following article:

http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/mcmillan/personal_page/documents/Market%20Institutions.pdf

gives a few examples of where centralized institutions seriously help fix the market for lemons. If you think about it, the only way to really fix the problem is to create an inexpensive method for good sellers to signal their product. The tricky part is making sure that bad sellers cannot send the same signal. I think it’s pretty hard to come up with some method that’s physically impossible for bad sellers to duplicate. They can forge a sheet of paper, fraud a certification test, plant fake buyers. The best way would be to seriously increase the cost for a bad seller to go through the same process. IE: legally enforcing contracts, legally punishing fraud and fake certifications, etc.

The article mentions the interesting case of fisherman. All over the world, fishermen are running into the problem of overfishing (I would imagine this might be an environmental issue as well) that is running prices extremely low, and forcing quality down in order to make up for it. New Zealand decided to tackle the problem by giving quotas to each fisherman in different species of fish. By making the quotas “tradable,” in theory fisherman will be trading away rights to fish that are inefficient for them to catch in exchange for efficient fish, but still keeping a quota on every species. This kind of solution seems relatively low cost and pretty simple to implement, but if New Zealand doesnt enforce the quotas, they would be meaningless. New Zealand decided to use military aircraft to enforce fishing zones, and officials document every step of every fish as it gets sold through different levels of trading. This is actually pretty expensive, and seems extremely inefficient and power-hungry to implement such a system, but it seems to be working pretty well. There is another example in the article that discusses even less intuitive beneficial results when property rights were given to squatters in Peru. In summary, the market for lemons could in some cases make it beneficial to spend extraordinarily large amounts of money to try to provide a way for good sellers to signal their product.